Abstract. This paper deals with block ciphers embedding a trapdoor which consists in mapping a partition of the plaintext space to a partition of the ciphertext space. In a first part, this issue is reduced to the study of the S-boxes of the cipher satisfying a few criteria. Then, differential and linear properties of such S-boxes are assessed and an algorithm to build optimal S-boxes is provided. Finally, these primitives are used to design a small trapdoor cipher resistant to both linear and differential cryptanalysis. This trapdoor makes it possible to recover the κ-bit master key with only one plaintext/ciphertext pair and an effort of 2 κ 2 encryptions.
Introduction

Motivation
Trapdoors are a two-face, key concept in modern cryptography. They are primarily related to the concept of "trapdoor function" -a function that is easy to compute in one direction, yet difficult to compute in the opposite direction without special information, called the "trapdoor". This first "face" relates most of the time to asymmetric cryptography algorithms. It is a necessary condition to get reversibility between the sender/receiver (encryption) or the signer/verifier (digital signature). The trapdoor mechanism is always fully public and detailed. The security and the core principle are based on the existence of a secret information (the private key) which is essentially part of the trapdoor. In other words, the private key can be seen as the trapdoor.
The second "face" of the concept of trapdoor relates to the more subtle and perverse concept of "mathematical backdoor" and is a key issue in symmetric cryptography (even if it may be extended to asymmetric cryptography; see for example the case of the DUAL EC_DRBG [16] ). In this case, the aim is to insert hidden mathematical weaknesses which enable one who knows them to break the cipher. If possible, these weaknesses should be independent of the secret key. In this context, the existence of a backdoor is a strongly undesirable property.
In the rest of the present section, we will oppose the term of trapdoor (desirable property) to that of backdoor (undesirable property). However, in the subsequent sections of the paper we will keep the term of trapdoor which has been already used in the very few literature covering this second face of this problem. We suggest however to use the term of backdoor to describe the issue of hidden mathematical weaknesses. This would avoid ambiguity and maybe would favor the research work around a topic which is nowadays mostly addressed by governmental entities in the context of cryptography control and regulations.
Inserting backdoors in encryption algorithms underlies quite systematically the choice of cryptographic standards (DES, AES. . . ). The reason is that the testing, validation and selection process is always conducted by governmental entities (NIST or equivalent) with the technical support of secret entities (NSA or equivalent). So an interesting and critical research area is: "how easy and feasible is it to design backdoors (at the mathematical level) in encryption algorithms?" This paper intends to address one very particular case of this question. It is important to keep in mind that a backdoor may be itself defined in the following two ways.
-As a "natural weakness" known -but non disclosed -only by the tester/validator/final decision-maker (e.g. the NSA). The best historic example is that of differential cryptanalysis. Following Biham and Shamir's seminal work in 1991, NSA acknowledged that it was aware of that cryptanalysis years ago. Most experts estimate that it was nearly 20 years ago. -As an intended design weakness put by the author of the algorithm. To the authors' knowledge, there is no known case for public algorithms yet.
As far as symmetric cryptography is concerned, there are two major families of cipher systems for which the issue of backdoors must be considered differently.
-Stream ciphers. Their design complexity is rather low since they mostly rely on algebraic primitives (LFSRs and Boolean functions which have intensely been studied in the open literature). Until the late 70s, backdoors relied on the fact that nearly all algorithms were proprietary and hence secret. It was then easy to hide non primitive polynomials, weak combining Boolean functions. . . The Hans Buehler case in 1995 [17] shed light on that particular situation. -Block ciphers. This class of encryption algorithm is rather recent (end of the 70s for the public part). They exhibit a huge combinatorial complexity that it is reasonable to think of backdoors. As described in [7, section 5.5 ] for a κ-bit secret key and a m-bit input/output block cipher there are ((2 m )!)
2 κ possible such block ciphers. For such an algorithm, the number of possible internal states is so huge that we are condemned to have only a local view of the system, that is, the round function or the basic cryptographic primitives. We cannot be sure that there is no degeneration effect at a higher level. This point has been addressed in [7, pp 124] when considering correlation attacks. Therefore, it seems reasonable to think that this combinatorial richness of block ciphers may be used to hide a backdoor.
Previous Work
One of the first trapdoor ciphers was created in 1997 by Rijmen and Preneel in [15] . The S-boxes are selected randomly and then modified to be weak to the linear cryptanalysis. They are finally applied to a Feistel cipher such as CAST or LOKI91. But because of the big size of the S-boxes, the linear table of such an S-box cannot be computed. However the knowledge of the trapdoor gives a good linear approximation of the S-boxes which is then used in a linear cryptanalysis. As an example, the authors created a 64-bit block cipher based on CAST cipher, and four 8 × 32 S-boxes. If the parameters of the trapdoor are known, a probabilistic algorithm recovers the key easily. Such a family of trapdoor ciphers leads to the recovery of only a part of the key, and the authors claim that the trapdoor is undetectable. But in [18] , Wu and al. discovered a way to recover the trapdoor if the attacker knows its global design but not the parameters. They also showed that there exists no parameter allowing to hide the trapdoor. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to mention that in practice, if a real cipher containing a trapdoor is given, the presence of the trapdoor will certainly not be revealed. Thereby, we will not focus in this section and in the rest of this article on ways to recover the trapdoor, but rather propose strong enough S-boxes to hide this trapdoor if its global design is not revealed. Our work is mainly a generalization of the ideas presented by Paterson in [14] . In this article, a DES-like trapdoor cipher exploiting a weakness induced by the round functions is presented. The group generated by the round functions acts imprimitively on the message space to allow the design of the trapdoor. In other words, this group preserves a partition of the message space between input and output of the round function. Such a construction leads to the design of a trapdoor cipher composed of 32 rounds and using an 80 bits key. The knowledge of the trapdoor allows to recover the key using 2 41 operations and 2 32 plaintexts. Even if the mathematical material to build the trapdoor is given, no general algorithm is detailed to construct such Sboxes. Furthermore, as the author says, S-boxes using these principles are incomplete (half of the ciphertext bits are independent of half of the plaintext bits). Finally, the security against a differential attack is said to be not as high as one might expect. Moreover, the author wondered whether the structure of trapped S-boxes acting imprimitively on the message space had to be linear.
In [8] , Harpes introduced a more general family of trapdoor ciphers. Such ciphers map a partition of the plaintexts to a partition of the ciphertexts and these partitions form the trapdoor. Harpes suggested using this trapdoor with its partitioning cryptanalysis.
More recently in [1] , the authors created non-surjective S-boxes embedding a parity check to create a trapdoor cipher. The message space is thus divided into cosets and leads to create an attack on their DES-like cipher in less than 2 23 operations. The security of the whole algorithm, particularly against linear and differential cryptanalysis is not given and the authors admit that their attack is dependent on the first and last permutation of the cipher. Finally, the nonsurjective S-boxes may lead to an easy detection of the trapdoor by simply calculating the image of each input vector. This problem is naturally avoided in an SPN in which S-boxes are bijective by definition. Finally, in [3] , Calderini and Sala defined the concept of "hidden sum" to design another family of trapdoor ciphers.
In a slightly different context, Caranti and al. provided a first answer to Paterson's question [5] , by proving that the imprimitivity of the group generated by round functions is actually related to the cosets of a linear subspace. They also gave some conditions to create such a primitive group to design a secure cipher that cannot contain such trapdoor, and finally show that AES respects these conditions. They add in [4] an algorithm to verify this last condition simply and show that AES and Serpent S-boxes verify this property.
Contributions
As detailed in the previous section, we intend to generalize the work of [14] and [8] for Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN). We study such encryption systems which map a partition of the plaintext space to a partition of the ciphertext space, independently of the round keys. To this end, the next section introduces some notations and definitions. Then, our results are organized as follows.
First, we show in Section 3 that the round function of such an encryption system must necessarily map a partition to another one. Moreover, this partition must be linear (the set of vector space cosets). Then we show that the substitution layer must necessarily map a linear partition to another one.
Second, we show in Section 4 that at least one S-box must map a linear partition to another one. When combining all these results, we prove that any encryption system which maps a partition to another one, must involve at least one S-box which itself maps a linear partition to another one. This result fully answers Paterson's question. In practical terms, it means that we can restrict the study of the global encryption algorithm to that of a single S-box.
Then, we study in Section 5 the linear and differential properties of S-boxes which map a linear partition to another one. We obtain several structural theorems as well as lower bounds regarding both linear and differential uniformities of such S-boxes. We also give an effective algorithm to build such S-boxes reaching these bounds.
As a practical application, we give in Section 6 an example (a toy cipher) of a trapdoor encryption system, based on our results. We explain how it works and its global design. Let us mention the fact that our attack used to break this system (with the knowledge of the trapdoor) has been suggested by Paterson who never used it practically. Furthermore, our S-boxes and the whole toy cipher are no longer incomplete.
Eventually, the conclusion and future works are presented in Section 7. Furthermore, it should be stressed that almost all the proofs of our results will be given in Appendices.
Preliminaries
Let us begin with some notations and conventions.
Notation. Let n and s denote positive integers. For two maps f and g, the composition g • f (or simply gf ) denotes the evaluation of f followed by g. For any set E, let #E denotes its cardinality. If F is a subset of E, F c denotes its complement. Let us denote the Galois field of order two by F 2 and 0 n = (0, . . . , 0) the zero vector of F n 2 . All the vector spaces considered in this paper are over the finite field F 2 . It is worthwhile to mention that (F n 2 )
s will be often identified with F An n-bit S-box is any permutation of F n 2 . If x and y are two elements of
In other words, L is the transpose of L for the bilinear form ·, · . Since we are concerned with ciphers which associate a partition of the ciphertext space to another partition of the plaintext space, let us introduce the following definition. The two partitions {{x} | x ∈ E} and {E} are called the trivial partitions of E. Observe that, for any permutation f of E,
That is, every permutation maps a trivial partition to another one. Moreover it should be highlighted that if f maps A to B and if A is non-trivial, then so is B.
In this paper, we are going to use a special kind of partitions which consists of cosets of a linear subspace. Such partitions have already been introduced by [8, Definition 4.4] and are recalled below. 
Definition 2.2 (linear partition). Let
We denote by L(V ) such a partition.
It turns out that the linear partitions associated with the two trivial subspaces of F n 2 , that is {0 n } and F n 2 , correspond with the two trivial partitions of F n 2 . Moreover, if V is a non-trivial subspace of F n 2 , then the linear partition L(V ) is also non-trivial. The following two propositions are interesting properties of linear partitions which will be used in the rest of the paper.
In particular, V and W are isomorphic.
Substitution-Permutation Networks and Partitions
Substitution-Permutation Networks, or SPN for short, belong to the class of iterated block ciphers. As every iterated block cipher, the encryption function consists in applying a simple keyed operation called round function several times. A different round key is used for each iteration of the round function. In practice, these rounds keys are extracted from a master key using an algorithm called key schedule. In an SPN, the round function is made up of three distinct stages: a key addition, a substitution layer and a permutation or diffusion layer. The substitution layer consists of the parallel evaluation of several S-boxes and is the only part of the cipher which is not linear or affine. Then, the diffusion layer is the evaluation of some linear maps (generally one). 
For any round key
It is worth recalling that we consider an SPN which maps a partition to another one independently of the round keys used. Thus, we consider round keys which are not necessarily derived from a master key by a key schedule. Consequently, the key schedule will be deliberately omitted throughout the article. Now, we turn our attention to the key addition and to the diffusion layer. The next proposition explains the fundamental property of linear partitions according to the key addition. This result was introduced by Harpes in [8] . Later, Caranti et al. gave a similar result expressed for imprimitive groups in [5] . For convenience, we restate this result with our own notations. Then, we focus on the diffusion layer in the next proposition. 
In particular, L maps a linear partition to another one.
Using the previous two propositions, we can now state our first main result about the structure of an SPN which maps a partition of the plaintext space to a partition of the ciphertext space independently of the round keys. 
r+1 that the encryption function E (k1,...,kr+1) maps A to B. Define
The result of this theorem can be restated in the following way. Firstly, the partitions A and B must be linear. However, the number of linear partitions is well below the number of any partition. Hence, the apparent and initial combinatorial aspect of our study is reduced to an algebraic one.
Secondly, we only suppose that the encryption function maps A to B after r rounds. Nevertheless, Theorem 3.4 ensures that any reduced version of this function also maps the partition A to another linear partition. In particular, the round function necessarily maps one linear partition to another one. As a consequence, our study of the full cipher is reduced to the study of the round function. Moreover, we have the following result. 
where W i denotes the subspace π −1 (V i+1 ). In particular, the substitution layer must at least map one linear partition to another one.
Combined with Theorem 3.4, this corollary ensures that if a cipher maps a partition A to a partition B, then the substitution layer has to map at least one linear partition to another one. Our study is thus reduced to the substitution layer, which is the aim of the following section.
Structure of the Substitution Layer
In the remainder of this section, V and W denote two subspaces of (F n 2 )
s . Recall that the substitution layer is itself composed of several cryptographic primitives, the S-boxes. Suppose that the substitution layer σ maps L(V ) to L(W ). At first sight, this hypothesis implies properties over all the S-boxes and not over each S-box independently of the others. The goal of this section is to highlight properties which only apply to one S-box.
Truncating a Few S-Boxes
Let E be any non-empty subset of 1, s . Let us define the following maps
If E has cardinality m, then we identify (F
s by keeping only the coordinates whose indices belongs to E. Note that T E is a linear map. The application σ E is a substitution layer limited to the S-boxes whose indices lies in E. Observe that σ 1,s is the substitution layer of the SPN. Moreover, the maps σ {i} and σ i are equal for all 1 ≤ i ≤ s.
Proposition 4.1 (Truncating a few S-boxes). Suppose that σ maps
Choosing E = {i} in the previous proposition gives that the i-th S-box σ i maps a linear partition to another one. Therefore, the hypothesis on σ implies one property on each S-box. Nonetheless, these properties can be trivial.
Let I be a partition of 1, s . According to Proposition 4.1, for any part I of I, the limited substitution layer σ I maps a linear partition to another one. However, the converse being false in general, this proposition alone cannot characterize the whole substitution layer. The next subsection intends to obtain the equivalence.
Example 4.2. Consider the subspace
2 . Define the permutations f and g of F It is easy to verify that f is a linear map whereas g is not.
Firstly, let the 3-bit S-boxes σ 1 and σ 2 be both equal to f . Thus, the substitution layer σ is also a linear map on (
However, the previous proposition does not imply anything on the S-boxes σ 1 and σ 2 . Indeed, T {1} (V ) and T {2} (V ) are both equal to F 3 2 , and hence L(T {1} (V )) and L(T {2} (V )) are trivial partitions.
Secondly, let σ 1 and σ 2 be both equal to g.
for each part I of I, but σ does not maps L(V ) to any linear partition. This illustrates that the converse of Proposition 4.1 does not hold.
Structure of the Subspaces V and W
Let I be a subset of 1, s . Let us define
with Triv
In other words, Triv
We call Triv I the trivial product subspace associated with I. It is indeed easily seen that Triv I is a subspace of (F n 2 )
s . Note that any trivial product subspace is the Cartesian product of trivial spaces for each S-box. They are essential in our study because σ always maps L(Triv I ) to L(Triv I ), no matter the S-boxes σ i are.
Moreover, we define s onto the subspace Triv I . Note also that V I is always a subspace of P I (V ). Moreover,
The next lemma gives some relations between the above notations. It will be then especially used in the proof of the main theorem of Subsection 4.4. 
Proposition 4.5 (Substitution layer structure). Let I be a partition of 1, s such that
In the case where V = I∈I V I , this proposition gives the converse of Proposition 4.1. Recall that if I and J are two partitions of 1, s , then the partition I is said finer than J if for any I in I, there exists J in J such that I ⊆ J. Thus, the finer the partition I is, the less S-boxes are involved in the limited substitution layers σ I , the closer we are to the primitives of the SPN. Fortunately, we have the following lemma. Consequently, we consider this minimal partition I min in the remainder of this section.
Linked and Independent S-Boxes
Proposition 4.5 and Lemma 4.6 then suggest the following definition.
Definition 4.7 (Linked and independent S-boxes). Suppose that σ maps L(V ) to L(W ).
Let I be a part of I min .
, then the S-boxes whose indices lie in I are said to be linked together.
Actually, if an S-box σ i is independent with regards to the subspaces V and W , then it can be replaced with any other S-box which maps L(T {i} (V )) to L(T {i} (W )) and the substitution layer σ still maps L(V ) to L(W ). Furthermore, if σ i is inactive, then it can be replaced with any other n-bit S-box. On the contrary, if only one of the linked S-boxes is replaced, then the desired property of the substitution layer may not hold.
Example 4.8. Let us go on with Example 4.2. It is easy to check that I min = {{1, 2}}, and thus, the two S-boxes are linked together. If σ 1 denotes the map f and σ 2 the map g, it can be verified that σ does not map L(V ) to L(V ) anymore. Thus, linked S-boxes cannot be replaced independently.
Lemma 4.9. Let I be a part of I min and E be a non-empty proper subset of I.
The next lemma states an important result about a particular case of linked S-boxes.
Lemma 4.10. Let E be a non-empty proper subset of I. Suppose that
Example 4.11. Let us continue Example 4.8. One can check that Lemma 4.10 applies for both E = {1} and E = {2}. As a consequence, σ 1 and σ 2 must be affine maps.
Reduction to an S-Box
It is now time to present our main result concerning the substitution layer. The proof is exceptionally put in the body of the paper since it helps to understand the structure of the subspaces V , W and their relations with the S-boxes. s which maps the element
Suppose that V is not a trivial product subspace. Then, at least one of the S-boxes maps a non-trivial linear partition to another one.
Proof. Let us prove this result by complete induction on the number s of S-boxes. Suppose that s = 1. In this case, σ = σ 1 . By hypothesis, V is different from {0 n } and
Let s ≥ 2 be an integer. Suppose that the result holds for any positive integer strictly lower than s. Firstly, suppose that all the S-boxes are independent. In other words, I min = {{i} | i ∈ 1, s }. If each S-box is inactive, then V is a trivial product subspace, a contradiction with our hypothesis. Thus, there exists at least one active S-box σ i . In this case, {0 ns } V {i} Triv {i} . According to Lemma 4.3, the equality
, and thus the result holds in this case. Now, suppose that some S-boxes are linked together. Then, there exists an element I of I min such that #I ≥ 2. Next, at least one of the following three cases holds.
-Suppose that there exists a non-empty proper subset E of I such that P E (V ) is not a trivial product subspace. Let m denote the cardinality of E. Recall that
Note that E is a non-empty proper subset of I, so of 1, s . Hence m < s, so the induction hypothesis ensures that at least one of the S-boxes of σ E maps a non-trivial partition to another one.
-Suppose that there exists a subset E of I such that V E is not a trivial product subspace.
Recall that σ maps
is not a trivial product subspace. As before, the result is a consequence of the induction hypothesis. -Suppose that P E (V ) and V E are trivial product subspaces for any non-empty proper subset E of I. Let E be a non-empty proper subset of I. Hence, P E (V ), V E and V I\E are trivial product subspaces. Then, Lemma 4.9 implies that
According to Lemma 4.10, the S-boxes σ 1 , . . . , σ m are affine maps. Combining Proposition 3.3 and 3.2, we obtain that these S-boxes maps any non-trivial linear partition to another linear one.
In any case, the result holds for this integer s. Finally, the theorem follows by induction.
Combining Theorem 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 with Theorem 4.12, we have proven that in a cipher which maps a partition to another one, at least one of the S-boxes must map a linear partition to another linear one.
The following section aims to design such an S-box with the best security against the main known cryptanalysis of block ciphers.
Relation with Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential [2] and linear [12] cryptanalysis are considered as the most important attacks against block ciphers [9] . The resistance of an S-box against these cryptanalysis is assessed with its difference distribution 
with a = 0. It is worthwhile to mention that the smaller the differential uniformity is, the more resistant f is against differential cryptanalysis. The same applies for linear cryptanalysis. Recall that two permutations f and g of F n 2 are said to be equivalent is there exist two linear maps
It is well known that equivalent permutations have the same differential uniformity and the same linear uniformity, see for instance [6] and [13] . More precisely, their differential tables are equal up to row and column permutations. This result holds for linear tables up to the sign of the coefficients.
Suppose that f is a permutation of
Consequently, without loss of generality, we can suppose that V = W in our study of the linear and differential properties of f .
In this section, we consider the following elements. Let V be a subspace of F n 2 and f be a
To avoid the trivial cases V = {0 n } and V = F n 2 , we suppose that 1 ≤ d ≤ n − 1. Therefore, the subspace V admits a complement space U of dimension n − d. Thus, the space F n 2 can be written as the direct sum U ⊕ V . In other words, every element x in F n 2 can be uniquely written as u + v with u and v in U and V respectively. Hence, the linear partition L(V ) equals
The following theorem is the structure result of permutations preserving a linear partition. It can be seen as a corollary of the Krasner-Kaloujnine embedding theorem [10] . However, for convenience, a proof of our special case is given in Appendix.
Theorem 5.1. There exist a unique permutation ρ of U and a unique family of permutations
(τ u ) u∈U of V such that, for all x = u + v in F n 2 , f (u + v) = ρ(u) + τ u (v) .
Conversely, if ρ is a permutation of U and if
This theorem allows one to design an S-box which maps L(V ) to L(V ) using permutations with smaller domains. Furthermore, these permutations can be chosen arbitrarily. For instance, f maps 1A to 02, both denoted in hexadecimal. Denote V = {00, 07, 1A, 1D} and U = {00, 01, 02, 03, 08, 09, 0A, 0B}. It is easy to check that V is a subspace of F 5 2 and that U is a complement subspace of We can easily check that the permutation f maps L(V ) to L(V ). Consequently, f induces a permutation of F . Therefore, ρ(00) = 02. In the same way, we obtain the following permutation of U . For each u in U , define the permutation 00 1D 07 00 1A 1D 1A 07 07 07 1A 1A 1D 07 1A 00 1D 00 1A 00 1D 07 00 07 1D 1A 1A 1D 07 00 1A 1D 00 07 00 1D
By construction, we finally have
In the rest of this section, let us fix the permutation ρ and the family (τ u ) u∈U given by Theorem 5.1.
The goal of this part is to express the linear and differential properties of f according to the ones of the permutations ρ and (τ u ) u∈U . However, these permutations are not defined on F
It is easily seen that L U and L V are both isomorphisms of vector spaces. Define the permutation
Example 5.3. Using the previous example, let us consider the basis B = (07, 1A) of V and the basis C = (01, 02, 08) of U . Thus, the isomorphisms L U : F The permutation ρ of F 
Linear Approximation Table
The next theorem relates the linear table of f to the one of ρ . The coefficients of the linear approximation table of f taken into account by this result are in practice the greatest. Thus, they determine the linear uniformity of f .
Theorem 5.4. Let a and b be two elements of
is one-to-one and thus onto because of the rank-nullity theorem. Corollary 5.7. For the linear cryptanalysis, the permutation f is at least
Note 5.8. We know that any 4-bit S-box is at least 4-uniform for the linear cryptanalysis, see for example [11] . As a consequence, the permutation f is at least 2 d+2 -uniform if n − d = 4.
Example 5.9. In Section E, we can see that the permutation f is 8-uniform for the linear cryptanalysis. Thus, we reach the lower bound given by Corollary 5.7 since the parameters of this example are n = 5 and d = 2.
Differential Distribution Table
Unlike linear cryptanalysis, where only a local view of the table was provided, the results for differential cryptanalysis brings both local and global outlooks. 
The previous theorem can restated in the following way. If DT f is rearranged coset by coset, a trivial operation allows to recover DT ρ . On the other hand, the next theorem is similar to Theorem 5.4 but for differential cryptanalysis. Again, it generally highlights the coefficients of DT f involved in the differential uniformity of f .
Theorem 5.11. Let v a and v b be two elements of
Particularly, the subtable Example 5.14. In Section E of the appendices, we can see that f is 12-uniform for the differential cryptanalysis. Thus, we reach the lower bound given by Corollary 5.13.
The Design of a Trapdoor S-Box and Further Observations
We now explain how to design such a trapdoor S-box. To this end, let us express the conditions given by the theorems of this section.
-Theorem 5.4 implies to reduce at most the linear uniformity of ρ to keep the one of f as small as possible. -In the same way, Theorem 5.10 implies to reduce at most the differential uniformity of ρ .
-The same theorem also stresses that the greater the number of non-zero coefficient of DT ρ is, the better. Moreover, we should emphasize that the closer the dimension d of V from n is, the weaker the S-box f is against linear cryptanalysis and the stronger f is against differential cryptanalysis. The lower bounds given by Corollaries 5.7 and 5.13 are represented on Figure 2 for any value of n ≤ 8. Finally, it should be highlighted that the linear and differential uniformities of the S-box of Rijndael [7] are far below the lower bounds given by Corollaries 5.7 and 5.13, no matter the dimension d of the subspace V is. As a consequence, this S-box does not map any linear partition to another linear one.
An Illustrative Example of a Trapdoor Cipher
Description of the Algorithm
In this last part, we use the previous results to design a toy trapdoor cipher. This cipher is a 24-bit Substitution-Permutation Network with 8 rounds (see Definition 3.1). The substitution layer σ consists of four parallel evaluations of the same 6-bit S-box S given in Section F of the appendices. The diffusion layer π is an isomorphism of (F 6 2 )
4 also defined in Section F.
The round function
Fig. 3. Representation of the toy trapdoor cipher
The key schedule and the round function are represented in Figure 3 . This algorithm derives 8 round keys from a 24-bit master key. Note that the master key is exactly the first round key k 1 . The only primitive of the key schedule is an isomorphism L of (F 6 2 ) 2 described in Section F. Every round of the key schedule follows the same pattern. Suppose that
4 is the i-th round key. First, a round constant c i is added to the current round key. This addition is computed in (F 4 , with the exclusive-or operation. The round constant c i of the i-th round is defined as the binary decomposition of the 4-tuple (i, 2i, 3i, 4i) of integers. For example, in hexadecimal, we have c 7 = (07, 0E, 15, 1C). Let y = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ) be the result of this operation. Then y is seen as the element ((y 1 , y 2 ), (y 3 , y 4 )) and the isomorphism L is evaluated in parallel. In other words, y is mapped to z = (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ) with (z 1 , z 2 ) = L(y 1 , y 2 ) and (z 3 , z 4 ) = L(y 3 , y 4 ). Finally, the (i + 1)-th round key is defined as (z 1 + z 3 , z 2 , z 3 , z 2 + z 4 ).
Before analyzing our cipher resistance to differential and linear cryptanalysis, we ask the reader to forget for a while that this cipher can obviously be broken very easily with a single plaintext/ciphertext pair through an exhaustive search. The purpose is to compare the known key recovery attacks (linear and differential cryptanalysis) when the attacker is unaware of the trapdoor with attack which exploit the knowledge of the trapdoor. While this comparison is a bit artificial here and holds only for illustrative purposes, it totally makes sense for real-life cryptosystems.
Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis
In [7] , Daemen and Rijmen introduced the differential and the linear branch number of a linear transformation. With an exhaustive search, it can be checked that the differential and linear branch numbers of π are both equal to 4. This implies that any 2-round trail has at least 4 active S-boxes. Thus, a 6-round trail involves at least 12 active S-boxes. Note that the S-box S is differentially 14-uniform and linearly 16-uniform. Therefore, the probability of a 6-round differential trail is upper bounded by ( 24 known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Here it does not make sense according to the cipher block size. Since our cipher is a 24-bit SPN, these cryptanalysis are ineffective on the 6-round version, so on the full cipher.
The Trapdoor
Let us define the following two 3-dimensional subspaces of F 6 2 V = {00, 0C, 17, 1B, 25, 29, 32, 3E} and W = {00, 07, 11, 16, 2B, 2C, 3A, 3D} .
It can be verified that S maps
. First, we consider the round function. The partition L(V 4 ) is left invariant under the key addition. Next, the substitution layer σ maps L(V 4 ) to L(W 4 ) and the diffusion layer maps
. Thus, the whole round function maps L(V 4 ) to L(V 4 ). At this point, the cipher is vulnerable to the basic attack of [14] which uses 2 12 chosen plaintext/ciphertext pairs and gives partial information about the unknown plaintext of any ciphertext. Moreover, in contrast to the trapdoor cipher presented in [14] , ours has not the drawback of being incomplete, thanks to the more complicated definition of the subspace V . Now, let us present a key schedule dependent attack suggested in [14] but not achieved. Let k 1 and k 1 be two keys in (F Observe that in practice, there is a very small number of candidates. Thus, the overall complexity of this cryptanalysis is roughly 2 × 2 12 encryptions compared to 2 24 for the brute force. Besides, if there are too many candidates, we can use two known plaintext/ciphertext pairs instead of one.
The main disadvantage of this cipher is that the linear approximation table and the difference distribution table of the S-box S can seem very suspicious. To this end, we define the S-box S given in Section F. This other S-box is equal to S with probability 60 64 . Now, let E and E denote the encryption functions of our cipher using the S-boxes S and S respectively. Assuming that all the round keys are independent and uniformly distributed (which is false, but works in practice) and that the plaintext p is chosen uniformly, we obtain E(p) = E (p) with probability ( 60 64 ) 32 ≈ 12% since the whole 8-round ciphers involve 32 S-boxes. Let us explain the trapdoor of this second cipher which is a chosen plaintext attack. 
Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we have addressed the following issue: "is it possible to design a mathematical backdoor which would rely mostly on suitable partitioning techniques of the plaintext and ciphertext spaces, independently of the round (sub)keys". We had in mind initially to exploit combinatorial properties of the core primitives. The overall conclusion we get is that if we want to design such a backdoor, the only solution is to stay in the algebraic domain. Let us summarize in detail the main results.
If one wishes to design any encryption system which maps any (plaintext) partition A to any other (ciphertext) partition B, independently of the round keys (here the knowledge of the pair (A, B) is precisely the trapdoor) then -the round function must map a linear partition to another linear one, and -at least one S-box must do the same.
This means that the partitions considered for the trapdoor are in the algebraic domain and not in the combinatorial one. We are condemned to consider highly structured algebraic objects.
From that, we have been able to design and propose a trapdoored encryption system which is weak for the cryptanalysis suggested by Paterson [14] and which enables to recover the secret κ-bit key with a single plaintext/ciphertext pair and with computing complexity in O(2 κ 2 ). For the candidates S-boxes enabling to design such a trapdoor (partitioning trapdoor), we have performed a detailed study with respect to their linear and differential properties. We have given lower bounds with respect to their linear and differential uniformities and we have explained how to achieve them totally (linear) or nearly totally (differential). Finally, we have designed an almost optimal trapdoored system with respect to our approach and initial goal.
This study shows that the linear and differential tables we have obtained are highly structured. Thus we have proved that this trapdoor class implies necessarily a high algebraic structure. In terms of trapdoor detectability, we conjecture that it is easy to detect and identify our trapdoor from the results presented in this paper.
As future works, we would primarily address the two following issues. Firstly, what would be the results if we consider non-independent round keys? In other words, we would like to consider a key schedule algorithm which therefore would be part of the trapdoor.
Secondly, we want to explore and formalize exhaustively a criterion which would enable either to design better hidden trapdoors or in the contrary to evaluate the presence of a potential hidden backdoor in the same way as linear and differential tables do (refer to Harpes work [8] ). The idea with respect to this criterion is the following: let denote S the set of S-boxes which map any linear partition to any other linear partition. For any S-box f we define the distance with respect to S as follows
This represents the minimal number of points we have to modify in the S-box to obtain an S-box which lies in S. In other words, the aim is to have a distance measure to a trapdoored S-box. In the second version of our toy trapdoored system (Section 6) we have indeed deteriorated the S-box (modified a few points). This second version "behaves" similarly to the original version with a probability 0.12. As a consequence, recovering the secret key will require more plaintext/ciphertext pairs. 
A Proofs for
Proof (of Proposition 2.3). Let
as f is one-to-one. Then, Lemma A.
This proves that the image of any part of
The result is then a consequence of Proposition A.1. 
Proof (of Proposition 2.4). By definition, f (V ) belongs to L(W
B Proofs for Section 3
Proof (of Proposition 3.2). Suppose that
The result is proven.
Proof (of Proposition 3.3).
Since L is an automorphism, we have
Proof (of Theorem 3.4).
Observe that α 0 = Id, and thus
On the other hand,
Since this equality holds for every k i , Proposition 3.2 states that A i is a linear partition.
It remains to show that A r+1 is linear. Let k r+1 be an element of F ns 2 . Define k i = 0 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Then,
Again, Proposition 3.2 implies that A r+1 is linear and the result is proven.
Proof (of Corollary 3.5). By virtue of Theorem 3.4, πσ(A
As π is an automorphism of
The result follows.
C Proofs for Section 4
C.1 Proofs for Subsection 4.1
Proof (of Proposition 4.1)
. Let x = (x i ) i∈E be an element of (F n 2 )
E . Let y be the element of (F n 2 ) s defined by y i = x i if i belongs to E and y i = 0 n otherwise. Thus,
since T E is a linear map. Furthermore,
In other words, the image of any part of
The result is a consequence of Proposition A.1.
C.2 Proofs for Subsection 4.2
Proof (of Lemma 4.3). Suppose that
. . , v s ) be an element of V . By hypothesis, v can be uniquely written as I∈I v I where v I belongs to V I for every I in I. Let I be a part of I. For every i in I, we have 
since I is a partition of 1, s . The inclusion W ⊆ I∈I W I follows. Finally, the definition of the
Conversely, suppose that W = I∈I W I . Conducting the previous reasoning with σ −1 instead of σ gives the equality V = I∈I V I , as desired.
Proof (of Proposition 4.5).
The implication is an immediate consequence of Proposition 4.1. Conversely, suppose that σ I maps L(T I (V )) to L(T I (W )) for any I in I. According to Lemma 4.3, for any part I of I, V I = P I (V ) and thus T I (V ) = T I (P I (V )) = T I (V I ). Then Lemma 4.4 ensures that the same result holds of the subspace W .
Even if it means to change the order of the S-boxes and the coordinates of the spaces V and W , we can assume that every part of I is an integer interval. Denote
s . Let x and v be elements of (F n 2 ) s and V respectively. By hypothesis, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, there exists an element w Ii of T Ii (W Ii ) such that 
Minimal Partition
Notation (partition intersection). Let I and J be two partitions of 1, s . We denote by I ∩ J the set {I ∩ J | I ∈ I and J ∈ J } \ {∅}. Note that I ∩ J is a partition of 1, s finer than I and J .
Lemma C.1. Let I and J be two partitions of 1,
Proof. Let v be an element of V and K be a part of I ∩ J . According to Lemma 4.3, we have to prove that P K (v) belongs to V K . By definition, there exist two parts I and J of I and J such that K = I ∩ J. Since V = I ∈I V I , the same lemma ensures that P I (v) lies in V I , hence in V . In the same way, using the equality V = J ∈J V J , we obtain that P J (P I (v)) lies in V J , so in V . The result follows because P J (P I (v)) = P I∩J (v) = P K (v). Lemma 4.6) . Let P denote the set of the partitions I of 1, s satisfying V = I∈I V I . By virtue of Lemma C.1, the set P is closed under the operation of intersection. Then, it is sufficient to define I min as the intersection of all the elements of P.
Proof (of
C.3 Proofs for Subsection 4.3
Generality on Linked S-Boxes Lemma C.2. Let I be a part of I min . Let E be a non-empty proper subset of I. Then V E P E (V ) and P E (V ) = {0 ns }.
Proof. By construction, V E is a subset of P E (V ). Let us prove that
K∈Imin∩J V K follows from Lemma C.1. Observe that the partition I min ∩ J is strictly finer than I min because E is a proper subset of I. This is a contradiction, and therefore
By contradiction, suppose that P E (V ) = {0 ns }. From the previous result, we have that {0 ns } ⊆ V E ⊆ P E (V ) = {0 ns }, which is a contradiction. Thus, P E (V ) = {0 ns }. Lemma 4.9) . By contradiction, suppose that V E is any trivial product space different from {0 ns }. Hence, there exists a non-empty subset F of E such that V E = Triv F . Therefore Triv F ⊆ V and so Triv F = V F . Next, Triv F = V F ⊆ P F (V ) = Triv F , and thus V F = P F (V ). Since F is a non-empty proper subset of P , we have a contradiction with Lemma C.2. Consequently,
Proof (of
By contradiction, suppose that P E (V ) is any trivial product space different from Triv E . There exists a proper subset F of E such that P E (V ) = Triv F . Thus, for every v in V and every i in E \ F , P E (v) i = 0 n . As a consequence, P E\F (V ) = {0 ns }. This is a contradiction with Lemma C.2 because E \ F is a non-empty proper subset of I. The result follows.
Study of a Special Case of Linked S-Boxes
Without loss of generality, Proposition 4.5 allows to suppose that I min = {I} with I = 1, s .
Proof. Denote #E by m. Consider the restriction of the linear map T E to V . Its kernel is
From the first isomorphism theorem, the quotient space V /V E c is isomorphic to the image T E (V ). Particularly, the equality #V /#V E c = #T E (V ) holds.
m . There exist two isomorphisms ϕ : 
where a denotes the element
Consequently, every element of V can be written in the desired form. As the converse inclusion is obvious, the equality
m } follows. Hence, the map ϕ is onto. Applying Lemma C.3 with the subset E c gives #V = #T E c (V )×#V E = #T E c (V ), and thus
Recall that σ maps L(V E ) to L(W E ). Then, Proposition 2.4 states that V E and W E are isomorphic, and so W E = {0 ns }. In the same way, we obtain that
m . The preceding argument gives an isomorphism ψ :
m } which concludes this proof.
Lemma C.5. Let m be a non-negative integer. Let
Then f is an affine map.
Proof. By hypothesis, choosing x = 0 gives the existence of an element y 0 of (
Let x be an element of (F n 2 ) m . By hypothesis, there exists an element y of (F
m . Especially, choosing z = x gives f (0) = f (x+x) = y+τ (x), and thus y = τ (x) + f (0). Let z be an element of (F n 2 ) m . Hence,
Then, we can combine equations (1) and (2) to obtain
Since this equality holds for every x and z in (F n 2 ) m , f is an affine map.
Proof (of Lemma 4.10). Firstly, we have
Even if it means to change the order of the S-boxes and the coordinates of the spaces V and W , we can assume that E = 1, m with 0 < m < s. According to Lemma C.4, there exist two isomorphisms
Let τ denote the permutation ψ
Let a be an element of (F
This is equivalent to the equalities σ E (x + a) = T E (y) + b and σ E c (ϕ(a)) = T E c (y) + ψ(b). This last one can be restated as
When combined with the first equality it gives
We have proven that for any
Then, Lemma C.5 states that σ E is an affine map.
Let i be an element of E. The map
is clearly linear (where δ i,j = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise). Observe that σ i = T {i} σ E I i . Therefore, σ i is the composition of several affine maps and thus it is an affine map.
D Proofs for Section 5
Proof 
The existence of the permutations ρ and τ u is now proven. Now, let show their uniqueness. Suppose that there exist a permutationρ of U and a family of permutations (τ u ) u∈U of V satisfying the result. Let (u, v) be an element of U × V . By hypothesis, we have
Because the sum of U and V is direct, it follows that ρ(u) =ρ(u) and τ u (v) =τ u (v). The uniqueness of ρ and the τ u follows.
Conversely, let ρ be a permutation of U and (τ u ) u∈U be a family of permutations of V . Let g denote the map from F n 2 to F n 2 defined by g(u + v) = ρ(u) + τ u (v). Since ρ and the τ u are permutations of U and V respectively and since F n 2 = U ⊕ V , the map g is a permutation of F n 2 . Let u be an element of U . Therefore,
The following lemma explains how the linear properties of ρ and the τ u are expressed according to the applications ρ and τ u . 
Proof. Let us begin with the linear table of µ . By definition,
Using the property of the transposed map, it follows
Let E denote the set of the right side of the previous equality. Then, #E = #L(E) because L is a bijection. Consequently,
It remains to prove the result about the differential table of µ . By definition,
Because L is one-to-one, L(x) = L(y) if and only if x = y. Furthermore, using the linearity of L, it follows that
This concludes the proof.
D.1 Proofs for Subsection 5.1
Proof (of Theorem 5.4) . By definition,
According to Theorem 5.1, the equality f (u+v) = ρ(u)+τ u (v) holds. The following equivalences come from the bilinearity of the map ·, · ,
Then, a, v = b, τ u (v) = 0 because a and b belong to V ⊥ . We then obtain that
Finally, Lemma D.1 implies that
The desired result is proven. 
Proof. By definition, we have
Observe that ρ(u) + ρ(u + u a ) and τ u (v) + τ u+ua (v + v a ) lie respectively in U and V . Since any element of F n 2 can be uniquely written as u + v, the previous equality holds if and only if
Note that the first equality is equivalent to u ∈ U. Thus,
The result is proven. 
As previously, we only have to prove the converse inclusion. Let v in V . Since λ is onto, there exists an element x of V such that λ(x) = µ(v)+v b . Then, v lies in F x+v . Moreover, the sets F v0 are pairwise disjoint as λ is one-to-one. Finally, #V = v0∈V #F v0 as desired.
Proof (of Theorem 5.10). Let
Since these sums are finite, they can be exchanged. Hence,
In the same way, it can be proven that . The result follows since any coefficient is the sum of even integers, so must also be an even integer.
In the same way, the next tables represent the difference distribution tables DT f of f and DT ρ of ρ and the DT τ u of the τ u . As explained in Example 5.12, the rows and columns of DT f does not follow the natural order in F [00]
[00] Observe that S(x) = S (x) if x lies in {0E, 32, 33, 39} and that S(x) = S (x) for any other element x of F 6 2 . The diffusion layer π is an isomorphism of (F 4 . Because of the linearity of this map, π is only defined on a basis of (F 4 . The following table gives the images under π of the elements of the standard basis of (F 4 .
x → π(x) x → π(x) (00, 00, 00, 01) → (3B, 3D, 30, 26) (00, 01, 00, 00) → (08, 33, 18, 2D) (00, 00, 00, 02) → (2E, 05, 16, 01) (00, 02, 00, 00) → (39, 14, 1F, 2F) (00, 00, 00, 04) → (19, 11, 3D, 3C) (00, 04, 00, 00) → (0F, 02, 2E, 19) (00, 00, 00, 08) → (01, 01, 38, 04) (00, 08, 00, 00) → (20, 04, 0D, 03) (00, 00, 00, 10) → (05, 0F, 02, 2A) (00, 10, 00, 00) → (2D, 28, 03, 1F) (00, 00, 00, 20) → (31, 1C, 12, 0A) (00, 20, 00, 00) → (23, 34, 06, 16) (00, 00, 01, 00) → (2D, 04, 0E, 1A) (01, 00, 00, 00) → (0A, 10, 24, 09) (00, 00, 02, 00) → (09, 1D, 16, 12) (02, 00, 00, 00) → (0B, 1D, 19, 04) (00, 00, 04, 00) → (1A, 30, 3D, 04) (04, 00, 00, 00) → (28, 16, 2A, 16) (00, 00, 08, 00) → (3D, 14, 21, 26) (08, 00, 00, 00) → (05, 3A, 04, 15) (00, 00, 10, 00) → (04, 1F, 15, 0D) (10, 00, 00, 00) → (1D, 39, 16, 3B) (00, 00, 20, 00) → (3C, 01, 0B, 10) (20, 00, 00, 00) → (21, 09, 10, 14)
For example, π(00, 00, 00, 03) = π(00, 00, 00, 01) + π(00, 00, 00, 02) = (3B, 3D, 30, 26) + (2E, 05, 16, 01) = (15, 38, 26, 27 ) .
In the same way, we define the isomorphism L of (F 6 2 ) 2 .
00, 01) → (15, 08) (00, 08) → (0B, 26) (01, 00) → (19, 2B) (08, 00) → (07, 08) (00, 02) → (0A, 09) (00, 10) → (31, 15) (02, 00) → (13, 31) (10, 00) → (1A, 2C) (00, 04) → (1C, 31) (00, 20) → (12, 07) (04, 00) → (0B, 13) (20, 00) → (20, 11)
